CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY IN WASHINGTON ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Attached is a copy of a Statement issued by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington on the occasion of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Statement on the Occasion of the 27th Anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - July 1, 1995

On July 1, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson and representatives from 60 other countries signed the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the East Room of the White House. Since the treaty was signed and entered into force in 1970, the NPT has achieved truly historic importance.

As of July 1, 1995, over 170 countries have become non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT, thereby making a legally binding commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, each one of the 179 NPT state parties, including the five nuclear weapon states, has agreed to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament which remains our ultimate goal.

The last 12 months have been extremely productive for achieving our twin objectives of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing their number. Most importantly, in May 1995, the NPT state parties decided, without conditions, that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely in accordance with article x.2 of the treaty.

Other recent developments have also contributed to reducing the threat of nuclear war.

Since July 1 last year, 15 countries have become parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states, including Algeria, Argentina, Chile, and Ukraine -- all of which have peaceful nuclear facilities. There remain only ten countries in the world that are not bound by the NPT or other comparable agreements. Of these ten, only three countries have not placed all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The United States has continued to dismantle nuclear weapons at a rate of between 1000 and 2000 per year. For the first time, the U.S. Has placed nuclear weapons material from its stockpile under IAEA safeguards.

In December 1994, the United States and Russia, together with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, brought the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) into force. Nine thousand nuclear weapons from U.S. and former Soviet strategic delivery vehicles will have been removed from deployment when the treaty is fully implemented.

In his January 21, 1995 State of the Union address, President Clinton called upon the Senate to approve START II. The Senate responded by beginning START II hearings on January 31. When START II is fully implemented, an additional 5,000 nuclear weapons will

have been removed from the deployed arsenals of the United States and Russia.

Also in January, the United States extended its moratorium on nuclear weapon testing until a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) enters into force, on the assumption that a CTBT will be signed by September 30, 1996.

In March, President Clinton announced that the U.S. would withdraw permanently 200 metric tons of nuclear weapons material from its stockpile. The United States will also reduce its stockpile of high enriched uranium from nuclear weapons by converting it to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors. The U.S. has also agreed to purchase 500 metric tons in high enriched uranium, previously used in dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, which has been converted to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors.

Also in March, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a multilateral ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The United States and Russia have agreed to cease production of plutonium for use in nuclear explosive devices. In April, the United Kingdom announced that it no longer produces fissile material for nuclear weapons.

In April, the U.S., UK, Russia, and France harmonized their policies prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are NPT parties except in the unlikely event of an attack by a non-nuclear weapon state allied or associated with a nuclear weapon state against a nuclear weapon state or its allies.

Also in April, the UN Security Council adopted by consensus a resolution setting forth in unprecedented detail the means by which to respond in the event that a non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT is subject to nuclear aggression or threat of such aggression.

At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the parties to the NPT agreed on an ambitious agenda including, inter alia, the adoption of the following measures and undertakings:

(a) universal adherence to the NPT as an urgent priority;

(b) a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996; pending entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear weapon states should exercise the "utmost restraint;"

(c) a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(d) the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally;

(e) the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction should be encouraged as a matter of priority;

(f) full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supplying nuclear equipment and material; and

(g) increasing the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

The NPT parties also agreed to strengthening and making more substantive the treaty's review process.

The United States fully supports this agenda and looks forward to its substantial implementation by the time of the next NPT Review Conference in the year 2000. In this context, we continue to urge all of the nuclear weapon states to join in a global moratorium on nuclear weapon testing as we work to complete a CTBT at the earliest possible time.

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